

Balancing Infrastructural Development and Social Welfare: An Islamic Perspective on the Ibadan Circular Road Project Controversy

Ridwan Olamilekan Mustapha^{a*}, Yakub Olawale Abdulwahab^b

^a*Department of Anthropology, Faculty of Arts, University of Alberta, Alberta, Canada*

^b*Department of Foreign Language Studies, College of Humanities and Culture, Osun State University, Nigeria*

*Corresponding author: romustap@ualberta.ca

Article history

Received: 2025-02-25 Received in revised form: 2025-09-22 Accepted: 2025-09-23 Published online: 2025-10-31

Abstract

This paper addresses the controversy on the Ibadan Circular Road (ICR) project in Oyo State, Nigeria, particularly its impact on residents displaced in six local government areas: Ido, Akinyele, Egbeda, Ona-Ara, Lagelu, and Oluyole. While the project aims at urban renewal and benefits for residents and commuters, many argue that the government's approach has imposed hardship on those displaced, leading to allegations of unfair practices. The study examines the issue through the lens of Islamic governance and urban development systems, suggesting that contemporary leaders can learn to balance infrastructure development with social justice. Using qualitative case study methodology, including government documents and surveys of 60 out of the displaced residents, the findings indicate that at least 500 individuals have become homeless due to government-initiated demolition. The paper recommends that the state government should have adopted Caliph Umar's principles to ensure a balance between development and social welfare, setting a positive precedent for future projects.

Keywords: Project, Ibadan, Circular, Islamic

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The Ibadan Circular Road project is a controversial 32 km infrastructure project in Oyo State, intended to ease traffic congestion for commuters and spur economic growth. However, its recent execution has displaced homeowners in six local government areas: Ido, Akinyele, Egbeda, Ona-Ara, Lagelu, and Oluyole. News reports indicate “no fewer than 500 houses” were demolished to clear land for the road (Mustapha, 2024). This situation has left many homeowners homeless and landowners in despair. Critics have argued that the government's approach has imposed hardship on the displaced residents, raising allegations of overreach and unfair practices. This has led residents to question whether the government-initiated demolitions were conducted with justice and fairness (Mustapha, 2024).

It is well known that several governors of Oyo State have awarded and re-awarded the Ibadan Circular Road project. According to Mustapha (2024), the origin of the Ibadan Circular Road has been widely debated. Some reports indicate that the late Alhaji Lamidi Onaolapo Adesina, a former governor of Oyo State, conceived the idea. In contrast, others attribute it to Senator Rasheed Adewolu Ladoja, the first governor to propose a project comprising 110 kilometres. The prevailing opinion, however, suggests that the project was designed during Ladoja's tenure. Blueprint (2023) holds that the idea gained significant attention during the tenure of the late Governor Isiaka Ajimobi, who implemented the design. The project came to fruition barely 15 years after Ladoja left office, and it was named in honour of the former governor who is said to have conceived the idea.

Furthermore, Ajimobi's leadership structured the project as a Public Private Partnership (PPP) with a Build Operate and Transfer (BOT) model. In June 2017, Ajimobi began work on the circular route, with construction of the 32 km stretch projected to cost N67 billion and an additional N11 billion allocated for earthworks and bush clearance. It was revealed that the construction company agreed to use financing obtained from the Nexim Bank of China to fund the circular road project. This indicates that the Oyo State Government, under Ajimobi, bore no financial obligation for the road project. After 25 years, the firm was to transfer road ownership to the state government. Unfortunately, the trajectory of the project changed when the APC Ajimobi-led administration was replaced by the PDP, led by Governor Seyi Makinde (Babalola, 2024).

There have been accusations and counter-accusations regarding the project's slow progress between the state administration and ENL Consortium until Governor Makinde took office. According to the state administration, the percentage of work visible on-site was not encouraging. In response, ENL pointed out that the governor had not delivered his pledge to provide a Letter of Assurance of Continuity. Amidst this back and forth, the governor invited another construction company, and a new deal was struck. Mustapha (2024) notes that under Governor Ladoja's administration, homes near the Ibadan Circular Road were initially subject to setback laws that mandated a 75-meter buffer on either side of the artery. This was expanded to 150 meters under Ajimobi's leadership, losing many homes and lands. Governor Makinde, however, deemed the previous setbacks insufficient, leading to the demolition of no fewer than 500 homes as part of the state's effort to acquire property for the project, after suggesting an unusual 1 km to demolish any obstructing property (500 meters to the left and 500 meters to the right of the road).

Following the demolition of houses for the project, there have been tragic incidents, including loss of life and setback for some, resulting in loss of hope and social identities for some individuals. Residents affected by the extraordinary 500-meter radius of the Ibadan Circular Road project protested in large numbers after the first round of demolitions, urging the government to revoke the order and denouncing the decision as harsh and barbaric. The demolitions impacted six local government areas: Lagelu, Oluyole, Akinyele, Egbeda, Ona-Ara, and Ido (Mustapha, 2024).

Residents from over a thousand communities along the Ibadan Circular Road corridor are protesting the Oyo State Government's plan to expand the road's construction pillars from 150 to 500 meters. According to a report by Punch (2025), the residents, representing six local government areas, have appealed to Governor Seyi Makinde to halt the proposed expansion, citing "dire social and economic consequences." During a protest at the Agodi Secretariat in Ibadan, demonstrators held placards stating "Our people are dying daily" and "Don't displace us again," explaining that many landlords have died just from the stress of previous displacement. The residents insist that they acquired their properties legally and are not encroaching on government land, urging the governor not to extend beyond the original 150-meter plan. In an attempt to resolve tensions, Governor Seyi Makinde stated that the decision to demolish properties within the 500-meter setback was based on a prior administration's plan. He pledged to revise this plan to maintain the initial 150-meter setback in densely populated areas and to integrate existing properties into the revised scheme, while prohibiting new, unapproved developments.

However, a critique by Babalola (2025) highlights several inconsistencies in the governor's remarks, suggesting they may be a diplomatic effort to appease the public. The governor's promise to maintain the 150-meter setback only in "densely populated areas" implies that the more extensive 500-meter plan will still be enforced elsewhere, potentially affecting communities with formal land rights. Additionally, the status of properties already demolished within the larger setback remains unaddressed. The governor's promise to integrate existing developments into the

plan also lacks clarity, particularly regarding informal structures that may not have formal approval. This ambiguity, according to Babalola (2025), points to a broader lack of transparency and consistency in the government's land management and fuels speculation that the land acquisition may be an act of "land grabbing" under the pretence of a public works project.

In this context, this paper seeks to examine the administrative model of Caliph ‘Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, whose administration is famed for justice (‘adl), consultation (shūrā), and protection of citizens’ welfare through fair compensation (ḥifẓ al-mal), equity (ṣulḥ), and human dignity (ḥifẓ al-karāmah). Historical accounts note that when ‘Umar expanded the Grand Mosque in Mecca, he purchased and fairly compensated property owners rather than seizing land outright. Similarly, when a mosque was built on a Jewish man’s plot, ‘Umar ordered it demolished and returned the land to its owner. These precedents embody principles of ‘adl (justice), ṣulḥ (equity), and ḥifẓ al-mal (preservation of wealth), which can serve as a model for the current governor of Oyo State in balancing urban development projects with justice and fairness while ensuring that citizens are not forced into indigence.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature review for this study is organised into four thematic categories: Displacement and Infrastructure Development, Compensation and Resettlement Policies, Islamic Governance and Justice, and Compensation Policy Under Caliph Umar Ibn Khattab.

2.1 Urban Development and Displacement

The implementation of large-scale urban development projects, while often framed as necessary for modernisation and economic prosperity, frequently results in forced displacement and significant social harm (Cerne, 2002; Guma, 2025). This issue is particularly acute in the Global South, where megaprojects aimed at creating a symbolic legacy for political leaders often fail to meet their stated goals and, instead, worsen urban exclusion and conflict (Siemiatycki, 2013; Schindler et al., 2021). The core problem lies in the imbalance between economic growth and the social welfare of vulnerable populations.

The social and human costs of displacement are well-documented across academic literature and case studies worldwide. Displacement for development purposes, even when legally sanctioned, can cause significant harm, including the loss of homes, livelihoods, and community ties (Robinson, 2003). Studies on the Makoko displacement in Lagos and dam construction projects show that affected individuals often face worse living conditions, increased overcrowding, and a decline in their social and economic stability (Babatunde et al., 2017; Amnesty International, 2006). Globally, reports indicate that over 65 million people have been forcibly displaced in urban areas (Global Alliance for Urban Crises, 2016), with Nigeria alone experiencing over 370 cases of urban displacement that affected more than 3 million people between 2010 and 2016 (Walker et al., 2018).

This disregard for social welfare is evident in numerous international examples. In Nairobi, a Chinese-funded expressway project left 40,000 people homeless after razing over 13,000 homes with little warning or resettlement support (Ram, 2021). Similarly, in Jakarta, a waterfront development has been criticised for acquiring land without fair compensation for fishing and farming villages (Maulana, 2024). Also, in Mumbai, low-income residents fear being relocated to toxic landfill sites under a slum redevelopment plan that excludes undocumented dwellers (Lohia, 2025). These cases demonstrate a familiar pattern: technical planning and project implementation

take precedence over the humane treatment of residents, turning compensation and consultation into mere afterthoughts (Cernea, 2000).

Despite these widespread issues, a gap persists in urban development policy and practice. Many development policies are critiqued as outdated, failing to prioritise human security and responsible resettlement (Vancly, 2017; Kaushal, 2019; Picciotto, 2009). While development is often framed as benefiting all, it disproportionately empowers politically and economically influential groups while worsening the plight of the marginalised (Kaushal, 2019).

In Nigeria, land acquisition for projects like the Ibadan Circular Road is justified using terms like “urban restructuring” (Adedeji, 2024), yet the process remains problematic. The lack of transparency, accountability, and citizen participation—highlighted in studies on projects in Abuja and Lagos—undermines their legitimacy and leads to conflict (Levan & Olubowale, 2014; Babalola, 2025). While existing literature has extensively documented the dynamics of displacement, less attention has been paid to the specific ethical failures within the land acquisition process itself (de Vries, 2024; Babalola, 2025). Our study builds on this by investigating how an Islamic ethical governance framework can address these underexplored issues and bridge the gap between development goals and social responsibility.

2.2 Compensation and Resettlement Policies in Nigeria

Compensation and resettlement policies are critical issues affecting displaced communities worldwide (de Vries, 2024; Schindler et al., 2021). In many cases, governments fail to provide adequate compensation or resettlement policies, resulting in negative consequences for those affected. In Nigeria, this challenge is rooted in a historical evolution of land tenure practices, transitioning from amicable, customary systems to more contentious, formal ones. Additionally, officials appointed by the government to oversee these processes may exploit the situation for political or tribal gain, leaving many individuals in emotional distress and poverty. For instance, the construction of the Lekki-Calabar Coastal Highway in Lagos led to protracted fights over compensation; only after public outcry did the federal government pay ₦2.75 billion to affected property owners (Uroko, 2024).

In the pre-colonial era, compulsory land acquisition was a community-based process characterised by open communication and trust between parties, largely due to the small scale of land needed for public projects (Egbenta & Udoudoh, 2018). However, the advent of colonial rule introduced a new, more formalised system. The seizure of private lands for urban expansion led to strong local resistance, prompting the British to introduce legislative acts like the 1917 Public Lands Acquisition Act, which provided a formal, though often challenged, framework for compensation (Babatunde et al., 2017).

Following independence, Nigeria continued to struggle with land acquisition issues, including arbitrary valuations and insufficient payments (Famoriyo, 1984). In response, the Land Use Act (LUA) of 1978 was enacted, centralising land ownership under state governors and establishing a new process for the compulsory acquisition of land for “public interest.” The 1999 Nigerian Constitution further reinforced this framework, mandating “prompt payment of compensation” and giving citizens legal recourse to challenge unfair acquisitions (Section 44) (Babalola, 2025). The failure to provide adequate compensation can, in fact, invalidate and delegitimize the government's actions.

Despite these legal advancements, the challenges persist. Researchers argue that monetary compensation alone is insufficient to restore the socio-economic status of displaced individuals (Cernea, 2003, 2008). In many cases, those affected, particularly in developing economies, lack the

literacy to fully understand the long-term consequences of displacement, often focusing solely on monetary compensation while overlooking the broader societal benefits of a project (Oluwamotemi, 2010). Zaman et al. (2021) note that Asian countries are now implementing new laws to protect people's socio-economic livelihoods, lifestyles, and cultural rights during resettlement. However, these legal advancements introduce new challenges for both financiers and those being resettled, particularly in making the process more inclusive, participatory, and sustainable.

Moreover, a lack of trust between citizens and the government often hinders the success of these projects, as seen in the Lagos Red Rail Line project, where project-affected persons expressed a lack of confidence in government efforts (Atobatele et al., 2023). This highlights the need for a more inclusive and participatory approach to land acquisition, where community engagement and trust-building are prioritised to ensure the process is equitable, sustainable, and beneficial for all parties involved. As would be explored in this study, the emphasis on *shura* in Caliph Umar's governance could provide a blueprint for a more just and humane approach to urban development.

2.3 Islamic Governance and the Ethical Imperative in Urban Governance

The pursuit of justice and fairness represents a foundational tenet of Islamic governance. Islamic law, or *Shari'ah*, is distinguished by its unwavering commitment to these principles, which must prevail even when the custodians of the law fall short (Mohamad, 2017). Scholars such as Rafiki (2020) and Randeree (2009) argue that effective Islamic leadership must be guided by the Qur'an and Hadith, emphasising the core values of justice, accountability (*al-amānah*), and service to society. This model of leadership is unique in its integration of worldly affairs with spiritual objectives, aiming to create a just and sustainable society.

This ethical framework extends directly to the built environment. Islamic urban planning is rooted in these same principles, prioritising social equity, community cohesion, and accessibility to public amenities (Nashrah, 2019). Critically, this system is rights-based, with authority derived from *Shari'ah* rather than a hierarchical state (Nashrah, 2019). This is best exemplified by the case of Caliph Umar, who, as documented by Akbar (1992), could not compel a citizen to surrender private property to expand a mosque without consent. This incident underscores the autonomy of private property and the state's limited power to override individual rights in the name of the public interest. His expansion of the Prophet's Mosque in Medina, for instance, was characterised by extensive consultation and public participation, prioritising community welfare over ostentatious displays (Omer, 2017).

Specifically, the administration of Caliph Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (634-644 AD) is celebrated for its exceptional governance and administrative acumen, which laid the foundations for a system marked by justice, consultation (*shura*), and the protection of citizens' welfare (as-Sallabi, 2007; Ishaq & Ridwan, 2023). Umar's leadership was characterized by a profound respect for the opinions of his companions and a commitment to equality and due process for all citizens (Sucilawati, 2020). He championed a system where all individuals, regardless of their status, were equal before the law.

His governance was also distinguished by innovative economic and judicial reforms that prioritized public benefit. Umar implemented a system of government intervention that nationalized agricultural lands, with the tax proceeds distributed equitably among all segments of society, ensuring that the benefits of development were shared by everyone (Sucilawati, 2020). Furthermore, his judicial reforms established a framework for fairness and due process. A powerful testament to this is the case of a Jewish man in Egypt whose property was seized for a

public park by a governor. Umar intervened, ordering the property to be returned and rebuilt, demonstrating his unwavering commitment to holding officials accountable and upholding the rights of all citizens, including minorities (Sucilawati, 2020; Hamamurad & Jusoh, 2023).

His administrative legacy, as explored by scholars like Diggi (2015) and Musaddad and Inuwa (2020), offers a blueprint for modern governance. The separation of judicial and administrative powers, the establishment of institutions like the *Divan* (treasury board), and the implementation of a fair welfare system funded by sources like *zakat* and *jizyah* highlight a structured and ethical approach to governance (Arif et al., 2021; Iqbal et al., 2020; Kusunadi, 2018). Caliph Umar's leadership, which prioritised ethical conduct and community welfare, exemplifies the principles of servant leadership and provides a historical model for responsible administration (Ogunbado et al., 2020).

In contrast to the ethical and participatory model of Umar's era, contemporary urban development projects often prioritise technical planning over human dignity, compensation, and consultation. The construction of the Lekki-Calabar Coastal Highway in Nigeria, for instance, has been marred by protracted disputes over compensation, highlighting a persistent failure to adequately address the needs of displaced communities (Uroko, 2024). This reflects a broader global issue where governments fail to provide adequate compensation or resettlement, often exacerbating poverty and emotional distress for those affected.

While some countries are implementing new laws to protect the livelihoods of people during resettlement, these legal advancements often introduce new challenges related to inclusivity and sustainability (Zaman et al., 2021). The case of the Lagos Red Rail Line project illustrates the pervasive lack of trust between citizens and government officials, with affected persons expressing a lack of confidence in government efforts and highlighting the need for more effective public engagement (Atobatele et al., 2023). This reflects what Ibn Khaldun (1967) notes as a shift away from the modest approach of Islamic urban development, a shift that is attributable to the change to the rise of wealth and the subsequent increase in luxury and ostentation, the display their power and wealth through extravagant urban projects, a stark contrast to Caliph Umar's austere and rational urbanism. By re-examining historical precedents of ethical governance, we can identify a viable path toward balancing infrastructural progress with social justice and a genuine commitment to public welfare.

2.5 Research Gap to Fill

Despite the rich historical context of Umar ibn al-Khattab's governance and his principles of justice in compensation during urban development, contemporary studies that apply these principles to modern infrastructure projects remain scarce. Much of the existing literature tends to focus either on theoretical frameworks of good governance or historical examples, failing to connect these themes to current practices. This study, therefore, seeks to move beyond simply documenting these failings. By exploring the administrative model of Caliph 'Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, which is famed for its principles of justice (*'adl*), consultation (*shūra*), and the protection of citizens' welfare through fair compensation (*ḥifẓ al-māl*), equity (*ṣulḥ*), and human dignity (*ḥifẓ al-karāmah*), this paper aims to provide a valuable ethical framework that can inform and guide contemporary urban development practices. We examine how the ethical models exemplified by Umar can be integrated into the governance of the Ibadan Circular Road project. In doing so, it will offer valuable insights into how Islamic principles can positively influence modern urban development policies and help mitigate the effects of displacement on vulnerable populations.

3.0 METHODOLOGY

This study employed a quantitative case study design, combining survey data with documentary analysis. Primary data were collected through structured questionnaires administered to residents displaced by the Ibadan Circular Road (ICR) project. Secondary data sources—including government reports, media coverage, and academic literature—were used to contextualize and corroborate the survey findings. The objective was to assess the socio-economic and welfare impacts of the project on affected households across six local government areas: Ido, Akinyele, Egbeda, Ona-Ara, Lagelu, and Oluyole.

3.1 Study Selection

A stratified random sampling technique was adopted to ensure representation from all six affected local governments. From each stratum, 10 respondents were selected, producing a total sample of 60 participants. Eligibility was restricted to individuals directly affected by displacement (i.e., loss of homes or land to demolition). This strategy ensured that data were drawn from those most directly impacted by the project while maintaining proportional representation across the LGAs.

4.0 PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

This chapter analyses the survey responses on Balancing Infrastructure Development and Social Welfare: An Islamic Perspective on the Ibadan Circular Road (ICR) Controversy. The statistical tools used to address the study's research objectives are frequency counts, percentages, means, and standard deviation Analysis. The summary of the data analysis is discussed below:

4.1. Demographic Information of Respondents

This section presents the demographic information of sampled respondents in the Ibadan metropolis, Oyo state. These features are age group, gender, marital status, local government area, occupation, and household size in the Ibadan metropolis, Oyo state.

Table 1: Demographic Distribution of Respondents

	Frequency	Percent
Age group		
40 to 45 years	15	25.0%
46 to 50 years	15	25.0%
51 to 55 years	12	20.0%
56 to 60years	12	20.0%
61 years and above	6	10.0%
Total	60	100.0%
Gender		
Male	52	86.7%
Female	8	13.3%
Total	60	100.0%
Marital status		
Single	14	23.4%
Married	39	65.0%
Divorced	2	3.3%
Widowed	5	8.3%
Total	60	100.0

Local government area		
Ido	18	30.0%
Akinyele	9	15.0%
Egbeda	14	23.3%
Ona Ara	11	18.3%
Lagelu	4	6.7%
Oluyole	4	6.7%
Total	60	100.0
Occupation of the respondents.		
Farming	24	40.0
Teaching	11	18.3
Trading	18	30.0
Self-employed	1	1.7
Driver	3	5.0
Artisan	2	3.3
Unemployed/None	1	1.7
Total	60	100.0

Source: Author's Field Survey, 2025

The demographic profile of the respondents, as presented in Table 1, shows a predominantly middle-aged population, with a mean age of 51.6 years (SD $\pm$ 6.94). Half of the respondents (50.0%) fell within the 40–50-year range, while 40.0% were between 51 and 60 years, and a smaller group (10.0%) were 61 years or older. The sample was overwhelmingly male, with 52 respondents (86.7%) compared to 8 females (13.3%). Marital status indicated that most respondents were married (65.0%), followed by singles (23.4%), widows (8.3%), and a small proportion who were divorced (3.3%). In terms of geographical distribution, respondents were drawn from all six affected local government areas. Ido accounted for the largest share (30.0%), followed by Egbeda (23.3%), Ona-Ara (18.3%), Akinyele (15.0%), and smaller groups from Lagelu and Oluyole (6.7% each). Occupationally, farming was the most common livelihood, reported by 40.0% of respondents, while 30.0% were traders. Teaching was also significant, accounting for 18.3%. Smaller proportions were engaged as drivers (5.0%) and artisans (3.3%). Only one respondent identified as self-employed (1.7%), while another (1.7%) reported no occupation.

4.2 Impact of Displacement

Table 2 presents the distribution of respondents by land ownership measured in plots. Although land sizes are conventionally expressed in square metres, this study adopts the locally prevalent measure of “plots,” where one plot is equivalent to 648 square metres. Results show that 21 respondents (35.0%) owned between 5 and 6 plots, while 18 respondents (30.0%) had between 3 and 4 plots. A further 14 respondents (23.3%) reported ownership of 7 to 8 plots, 4 respondents (6.7%) had between 1 and 2 plots, and 2 respondents (3.3%) possessed 9 or more plots. Only 1 respondent (1.7%) reported not owning any land.

Table 2: Land size of the respondents.

Land size of the respondents.	Frequency	Percent
1 to 2	4	6.7
3 to 4	18	30.0
5 to 6	21	35.0
7 to 8	14	23.3
9 and above	2	3.3
None	1	1.7
Total	60	100.0

Source: Author's Field Survey, 2025

Findings from Table 3 indicate that 54 respondents (90.0%) were directly affected by the demolitions, while only 6 respondents (10.0%) were not.

Table 3: Direct Effect of the demolition of house for the Ibadan Circular Road Project

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	54	90.0
No	6	10.0
Total	60	100.0

The duration of residence before displacement varied among respondents as shown in Table 4. Seventeen (28.3%) had lived in their homes for 5–6 years, and sixteen (26.7%) for 7–8 years. Ten respondents (16.7%) had stayed 3–4 years, while another ten (16.7%) had lived there for 9 years or more. Only one respondent (1.7%) had lived there for 1–2 years, while six (10.0%) did not specify.

Table 4: Duration of residence before displacement

Responses	Frequency	Percent
1 to 2 years	1	1.7
3 to 4 years	10	16.7
5 to 6 years	17	28.3
7 to 8 years	16	26.7
9 years and above	10	16.7
None	6	10.0
Total	60	100.0

Table 5 on the accommodation types before displacement show that 40 respondents (66.6%) lived in their own homes, 10 (16.7%) in rented houses, 3 (5.0%) in family residences, and 1 (1.7%) in another type of arrangement. Six respondents (10.0%) gave no response. This indicates that the majority were owner-occupiers.

Table 5: Accommodation types before displacement

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Own home	40	66.6
Rented accommodation	10	16.7
Family residence	3	5.0
Others	1	1.7
None	6	10.0
Total	60	100.0

When asked how the displacement has affected their housing situation, 24 respondents (40.0%) indicated that they were living with relatives or friends, 18 (30.0%) were homeless, and 10 (16.7%) were renting new accommodation. Two respondents (3.3%) reported other arrangements, while six (10.0%) did not specify, as presented in Table 6. This shows that most displaced persons relied on relatives or friends for shelter.

Table 6: Housing situation after displacement

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Currently homeless	18	30.0
Living with relatives or friends	24	40.0
Renting a new place	10	16.7
Others	2	3.3
None	6	10.0
Total	60	100.0

Table 7 shows that awareness of the mortality impact of displacement was high: 50 respondents (83.3%) reported being aware, while 10 (16.7%) were not. This suggests widespread recognition of the human cost of the project; therefore, the perceptual estimate of the number of victims could be trusted.

Table 7: Awareness of the mortality impact of this displacement

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	50	83.3
No	10	16.7
Total	60	100.0

Respondents estimated the number of mortality cases in their local governments as presented in Table 13. Thirty (50.0%) reported 3–4 deaths, 16 (26.6%) reported 1–2, 2 (3.3%) reported 5–6, and 1 respondent (1.7%) each reported 7–8 and 9 or more. Six respondents (16.7%) did not specify. Overall, most respondents estimated 3–4 deaths in their locality.

Table 8: Estimation of people in the local government of victims of mortality

Responses	Frequency	Percent
1 to 2	16	26.6
3 to 4	30	50.0
5 to 6	2	3.3
7 to 8	1	1.7
9 and above	1	1.7
None	10	16.7
Total	60	100.0

4.3 Government Response and Compensation

The findings reveal a near-total absence of government support for displaced residents. As shown in Table 9, a large majority, 48 respondents (80.0%), reported receiving no compensation at all, while only 12 (20%) acknowledged receiving some form of payment.

Table 9: Form of compensation from the government after the displacement

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	12	20.0
No	48	80.0
Total	60	100.0

Among those who did receive compensation, satisfaction was extremely low, as 9 of them indicated high dissatisfaction compared to 3 who were either very satisfied or moderately satisfied (Table 10).

Table 10: Satisfied with the Compensation Received

	Frequency	Percent
None received	48	80.0
Very satisfied	1	1.7
Satisfied	2	3.3
Very dissatisfied	9	15.0
Total	60	100.0

Perceptions of fairness followed a similar pattern (Table 11). Nearly four-fifths of the respondents (78.3%) considered the process unfair, while 20.0% were unsure, and only a single respondent (1.7%) felt that the compensation could be described as fair

Table 11. Do you feel the compensation was fair?

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Yes	1	1.7
No	47	78.3
Unsure	12	20.0
Total	60	100.0

Resettlement support was also judged overwhelmingly inadequate (Table 12). Four-fifths of the respondents (80.0%) rated the government's efforts as very inadequate, with only a handful perceiving them as adequate (1.7%) or very adequate (6.6%). Together, these findings highlight a systemic failure to provide meaningful redress for those displaced by the Ibadan Circular Road project.

Table 12: How adequate was the support provided by the government for resettlement

Responses	Frequency	Percent
None	3	5.0
Very adequate	4	6.6
Adequate	1	1.7
Neutral	1	1.7
Inadequate	3	5.0
Very inadequate	48	80.0
Total	60	100.0

4.4 Personal Impact and Community Support

The primary challenges reported after displacement reveal multiple layers of hardship (Table 13). Nearly all respondents (93.3%) identified “other difficulties” as a major challenge, while 75.0% pointed to the loss of community ties. Emotional distress was reported by 63.3%, financial difficulties by 58.3%, and lack of shelter by another 63.3%. The weighted mean (1.68) exceeded the criterion mean (1.50), confirming that these were significant challenges across the sample.

Table 13: Distribution of primary challenges faced after being displaced

S/N	Item Description	Yes (%)	No (%)	$\bar{X}$	S. Dev.	Rank
1	Financial Difficulties	35 (58.3)	25 (41.7)	1.58	.49	5
2	Emotional distress	32 (53.3)	28 (46.7)	1.53	.50	4
3	Lack of shelter	38 (63.3)	22 (36.7)	1.63	.48	3
4	Loss of community ties	45 (75.0)	15 (25.0)	1.75	.43	2
5	Others	56(93.3)	4 (6.7)	1.93	.25	1
N=60, Average mean=1.68, Weighted mean=1.50				1.68	0.43	

Source: Field survey, 2025

Despite these hardships, few respondents sought support from organisations or community groups (Table 14). The vast majority (86.7%) said they did not seek help, while only 8.3% did, and 5.0% were unsure. Among those who turned to organisations, most mentioned faith-based groups such as the Muslim Students Society of Nigeria (MSSN, 8.3%) and NASFAT (5.0%) (Table 15).

Table 14: Sought support from any organisations or community groups after your displacement

Responses	Frequency	Percent
Unsure	3	5.0
Yes	5	8.3
No	52	86.7
Total	60	100.0

Table 15: If yes, which organisation or groups did you approach?

Responses	Frequency	Percent
None	52	86.7
NASFAT	3	5.0
MSSN	5	8.3
Total	60	100.0

However, the effectiveness of such support was minimal (Table 16). Most respondents (63.3%) reported receiving no assistance at all. A quarter (23.4%) described the support they received as neutral or uncertain, while small numbers found it either very unhelpful (8.3%) or very helpful (5.0%). These findings suggest that displaced persons not only faced significant financial, social, and emotional challenges but also lacked effective external support systems to mitigate their suffering.

Table 16: How helpful was the support received from these organisations or community groups

Responses	Frequency	Percent
None	38	63.3
Very helpful	3	5.0
Neutral/Unsure	14	23.4
Very Unhelpful	5	8.3
Total	60	100.0

4.5 Perspective on Infrastructural Development

Most respondents expressed strong support for infrastructure development in principle, with 93.3% agreeing that projects like the Ibadan Circular Road are important for urban growth, and only 3.3% disagreeing or were indifferent (Table 17). When asked how the government could improve future projects to avoid harming residents, the majority (55.0%) emphasised the need for proper funding, while others suggested empowerment initiatives (28.3%) or provision of shelter (8.3%). Smaller groups recommended combined measures such as shelter with funding (3.3%) or funding with empowerment (1.7%), while 3.3% had no suggestions (Table 18).

Table 17: Do you believe that infrastructure projects like the Ibadan Circular Road are important for urban development

	Frequency	Percent
Not applicable	2	3.3
Yes	56	93.4
No	2	3.3
Total	60	100.0

Table 18: What suggestions for the government to improve future infrastructure projects to avoid harming residents?

Responses	Frequency	Percent
No suggestions	2	3.3
Funding	33	55.0
Empowerment	17	28.3
Provision of Shelter	5	8.3
Shelter and Funding	2	3.3
Funding and Empowerment	1	1.7
Total	60	100.0

Interestingly, when asked how the government could ensure fairness in handling such projects, all respondents (100.0%) stated they had no opinion, perhaps reflecting a lack of trust in official processes (Table 19). In their additional comments, most respondents once again highlighted funding as their primary concern (88.4%), with a few calling for empowerment (3.3%), while 8.3% offered no further remarks (Table 20).

Table 19: In your opinion, how can the government ensure a fair process for residents affected by such projects in the future

Responses	Frequency	Percent
No Opinion	60	100.0
Unsure	0	0
Total	60	100.0

Table 20: Additional comments or thoughts regarding your experience with the Ibadan Circular Road project

Responses	Frequency	Percent
No additional comments	5	8.3
Funding	53	88.4
Empowerment	2	3.3
Total	60	100.0

4.6 Discussion of Findings

The findings of this study reveal a profound and systemic disconnect between the ethical principles of justice and welfare, as exemplified by Caliph ‘Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, and the reality of the ICR project's implementation. The data directly refutes the notion that this megaproject has been a net positive for all residents, instead providing a powerful case study of involuntary displacement and its human cost. The results highlight a clear violation of core Islamic principles and suggest that the current governance framework is ill-equipped to manage urban development equitably.

The survey data indicates a near-total absence of government support for displaced residents, directly contradicting key tenets of the ethical governance model proposed by Caliph Umar.

On *Hijz al-Māl*, the principle of preserving wealth and property is clearly violated by the project's execution. The study found that a majority of the respondents (66.6%) were owner-occupiers who lost their homes, yet a staggering 80% of those affected received no compensation at all. In Umar's model, landowners affected by public works would have been justly and fairly compensated (As-Ṣallābī, 2007; Egypt's Darul Ifta, 2024). This disparity demonstrates a profound neglect of citizens' property rights and wealth protection, which is antithetical to the Islamic ideal of just recompense (Allahham, 2025).

The ICR project was perceived as deeply unfair by the affected community, negating the principle of justice (‘adl) and fairness. An overwhelming 78.3% of respondents felt the process was unjust, a finding that points to a fundamental breakdown in equitable governance. The lack of transparency and the arbitrary nature of the demolitions, often conducted with little warning or explanation, directly breach the Qur’anic command to rule “with justice among people”(Q. 4:58). This stands in stark contrast to Umar, who was famously open to public correction and committed to transparent administration (Al-Sallabi, 2007).

Furthermore, the project's implementation proceeded with a near-total absence of genuine community consultation (shūra). Respondents reported learning of the new 500-meter setback only after the fact, a clear failure to engage with the very people who would be most impacted. Umar institutionalised consultation through formal councils and by urging leaders to solicit public

feedback (Hamad, 2025; Sucilawati, 2020). By neglecting this critical principle of *shura*, the project disenfranchised citizens and failed to secure their consent, leading to conflict and mistrust. The fact that all respondents had “no opinion” on how to ensure a fair process in the future suggests a complete loss of faith in the existing governance framework’s ability to act transparently.

Finally, the human cost of the displacement is a direct contravention of the Islamic principle of *Hifz al-Karāmah* (preserving human dignity). The study found that 40% of displaced residents were forced to live with relatives and friends, while 30% were rendered homeless, serving as a grave indicator of the project’s impact. The high percentage of respondents citing a “lack of shelter” and “loss of community ties” underscores the emotional and social distress caused by the displacement. This neglect of human welfare is a stark departure from Umar’s philosophy of leadership, which holds that leaders are responsible for the well-being of even the most vulnerable members of society.

Overall, the findings reveal a crucial paradox: the displaced population is not inherently anti-development. A staggering 93.4% of respondents believe that infrastructure projects are important for urban growth, indicating that their discontent is not with the project's purpose but with its unjust execution. The requests from the affected population for “funding” (55.0%), “empowerment” (28.3%), and “provision of shelter” (8.3%) align perfectly with the ethical framework of Islamic jurisprudence. These are direct calls for the implementation of fair compensation, consultation, and compassionate support.

The ICR case is not unique; it mirrors a systemic failure in urban development across cities like Lagos, Nairobi, and Jakarta, where governments repeatedly prioritise project timelines over human rights (Amnesty International, 2006; Lohia, 2025; Uroko, 2024; Maulana, 2024; Ram, 2021). These examples demonstrate that urban development does not have to be a zero-sum game. By adopting an ethical governance framework that prioritises human welfare alongside infrastructural progress, cities can achieve sustainable and inclusive growth.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The research highlights the significant socio-economic consequences of the Ibadan Circular Road (ICR) on the displaced residents of the six affected local governments. These consequences include loss of housing, disruptions to livelihoods, and financial instability. The high rate of displacement, combined with inadequate government compensation and ineffective stakeholder engagement, has left many individuals in critical situations, struggling with the loss of their homes and livelihoods. The displaced individuals are mainly dissatisfied with the compensation provided by the government and are facing challenges in reintegrating into new communities.

This study demonstrates how the administrative model of Caliph ‘Umar Ibn al-Khaṭṭāb provides a robust ethical framework that can inform and guide contemporary urban development practices. By focusing on principles of justice, consultation, and the protection of citizens’ welfare, this model offers a viable path toward bridging the gap between development goals and social responsibility, thereby mitigating the negative effects of displacement on vulnerable populations.

The data from this study provides empirical evidence of the chasm between modern public policy and the ethical requirements of Islamic governance. The widespread lack of compensation, the forced displacement of homeowners, and the subsequent homelessness of a significant portion of the population all serve as a powerful testament to the consequences of neglecting social justice in infrastructural development. The findings strongly suggest that integrating Umar’s ethical models into the governance of projects like the ICR could have mitigated these negative effects,

proving that Islamic principles can indeed offer a viable and humane blueprint for modern urban development policies.

Based on these insights, the government must establish a more inclusive and transparent compensation system. This will help to cushion displacement effects for future infrastructure projects. This would also ensure that displaced individuals receive timely and fair compensation. Additionally, the government should prioritise strategies to address the negative impacts of displacement through effective stakeholder engagement, relocation support, and livelihood restoration programs, by doing so, it would ensure fair treatment for displaced residents. Without the aforementioned measures, such large-scale projects will likely put socio-economic inequalities on the rise and hinder sustainable development in urban areas

Acknowledgement

We acknowledge the support of the affected residents of the circular project for taking the time to attend the survey.

Conflicts of Interest

The author(s) declare(s) that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this paper

List of Reference

- Adama, O. (2018) Urban imaginaries: Funding mega infrastructure projects in Lagos, Nigeria, *GeoJournal*, 83 (2), 257-274
- Adedeji, D. (2024). The tragedy of Ibadan circular road. *Oyo Insight*. <https://oyoinsight.com/the-tragedy-of-ibadan-circular-road-debo-adedeji/> Retrieved on December 14, 2024
- Alabed, M. (2017). *Exploring the Islamic principles on leadership and its implementation between Muslim leaders in Sweden* (Master's thesis, Chalmers University of Technology, Göteborg, Sweden). Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Division of Construction Management.
- Allahham, A. (2025) The untold stories of “Islamic” architecture and urbanism: rationality and power manifestations. *City Territ Archit*, 12, 19. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40410-025-00264-w>
- Al-Sallabi, A. (2019). Urban development during the reign of Umar ibn al-Khattab. *Al Jazeera Blogs*. Retrieved September 30, 2024, from <https://alsalabi.com/article/1479#:~>
- Amnesty International (2006) Nigeria: Making the destitute homeless– forced evictions in Makoko, Lagos State. Retrieved From: <https://www.amnesty.org/es/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/afr440012006en.pdf> Retrieved on December 14, 2024
- Al-Sallabi, A. (2007), *Umar Ibn Al-khattab: His Life and Times*, 1&2. International Islamic Publishing House.
- Atobatele, A., Moliki, A., Deinde-Adedeji, O., & Dele-Dada, M. (2023). Resettlement action plan of Lagos Red Rail Line and project affected persons' (PAPs) perception. Covenant University. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-2984903/v1>
- Babalola, A. B. (2024). Ibadan circular road corridor: Is Gov. Makinde's 1km setback for public interest or personal interest? Freshpage. <https://freshpage.com.ng/news/ibadan-circular-road-corridor-is-gov-makindes-1km-setback-for-public-interest-or-personal-interest-ademola-bablow-babalola/> Retrieved on December 22, 2024
- Babalola, T.O. (2025). How responsible are land acquisitions for megaprojects in global south cities? *Cities*, 166, 106307 DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cities.2025.106307>

- Babatunde, S., Adeniyi, O., and Awodele, O. (2017) Investigation into the causes of delay in land acquisition for PPP projects in developing countries, *Journal of Engineering, Design and Technology*, 15 (4), 552-570.
- Berry-Chikhaoui, I. (2010). Major urban projects and the people affected: The case of Casablanca's Avenue Royale. *Built Environment*, 36 (2), 216-229.
- Blueprint. (2023). How Ibadan circular road will open corridors for economic activities. Retrieved October 1, 2024, from <https://blueprint.ng/how-ibadan-circular-road-will-open-corridors-for-economic-activities/#:~>
- Cernea, M. M. (2002). "Impoverishment risks and reconstruction: A model for population displacement and resettlement." In M. M. Cernea & C. McDowell (Eds.), *Risks and reconstruction: Experiences of resettlers and refugees*. 11-55. The World Bank.
- Cernea, M. M. (2003). For a new economics of resettlement: A sociological critique of the compensation principle. *International Social Science Journal*, (175). UNESCO, Paris: Blackwell.
- Cernea, M. M. (2008). Compensation and benefit sharing: Why resettlement policies and practices must be reformed. *Water Science and Engineering*, 1(1), 89–120. <https://doi.org/10.3882/j.issn.1674-2370.2008.01.009>
- de Vries, W.T. (2024) How to Know if Land Management is Responsible? Evaluating the 8R Framework of Responsible Land Management. *The Journal of Indonesia Sustainable Development Planning*, 5, 76–80, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.46456/jisdep.v5i1.546>.
- Diggi, B. B. (2015). Historical perspectives on good governance in Islam: The case of Caliph Umar bn Abd Al-Aziz, Umar II (61-101 AH – 680-719 CE). Paper presented at the Fountain University, Oshogbo, Nigeria. Theme: The Moslem agenda for Nigeria: Challenges of development and good governance.
- Edun, A. O., Akinde, J. O., Olaleye, S. O., & Idowu, G. A. (2013). Infrastructural development and its effect on economic growth: The Nigerian perspective. *European Scientific Journal*, 9(31), 431-446.
- Egbenta, I., and Udoudoh, F. (2018) Compensation for land and building compulsorily acquired in Nigeria: A critique of the valuation technique. *Property Management*, 36 (4), 446-460.
- Egypt's Darul Ifta. (2024). The second caliph Umar: Extending civil liberties to non-Muslims. Retrieved September 26, 2024, from <https://www.dar-alifta.org/en/article/details/543/the-second-caliph-umar-extending-civil-liberties-to-non-muslims>
- Famoriyo, S. (1984) Land acquisition and irrigation in Nigeria, *Land Use Policy*, 1(1), 55-63.
- Global Alliance for Urban Crises, & International Rescue Committee. (2016). Forced displacement in urban areas: What needs to be done.
- Guma, P.K. (2025), Everyday Infrastructures of Urban Life. *International Journal of Urban Regional Research*, 49: 479-497. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2427.13324>
- Hamamurad, Q., and Jusoh, A. (2023) Islamic Civilization's Influence on Modern City Planning. *Ahabs International Action Conference*. 3, 51-66.
- Hardana, E. N., & Kholiq, A. (2023). Social benefit system during the government of Omar ibn Khattab. 1(1), 43. Ann Publisher, <http://annpublisher.org>
- Ibn Khaldun, A. (1967) *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. Princeton University Press, New Jersey. <https://delong.typepad.com/files/muquaddimah.pdf>. Retrieved on December 27, 2024
- Iqbal, M., Aulia, R., Anggraini, J., & Sidik, A. (2020). Measuring the relevance of Umar bin Khattab's fiscal policy concept in Indonesia. *Journal of Islamic Economics*. 9, 70-88

- Ishaq, I., & Ridwan, M. (2023). A study of umar bin Khatab's Ijtihad in an effort to formulate Islamic law reform. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 9(2). DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2023.2265522>
- Kaushal, N. (2009). Displacement: An undesirable and unwanted consequence of development. *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, 70(1), 77–89. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41856497>
- Kennedy, L. (2015). The politics and changing paradigm of megaproject development in metropolitan cities. *Habitat International*, 45, 163-168.
- Kusnadi, J. (2018). Economic policy of caliph Umar ibn Khattab. *Munich Personal RePEc Archive*, MPR4 Paper No. 87819. <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/87819/> Retrieved on December 27, 2024
- Lawanson, T., and Agunbiade, M. (2018). Land governance and megacity projects in Lagos, Nigeria: The case of Lekki Free Trade Zone, *Area Development and Policy*, 3 (1), 114-131.
- Levan, C., & Olubowale, J. (2014). 'I am here until development comes' Displacement, demolitions, and property rights in urbanizing Nigeria. *African Affairs*, 113(452), 387-408. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adu030>
- Lohia, E. (2025) "Redevelopment plan sparks fear of displacement and toxic relocation," Mongabay India, 10 Jul 2025. <https://india.mongabay.com/2025/07/redevelopment-plan-sparks-fear-of-displacement-and-toxic-relocation/> Retrieved on January 28, 2025
- Masruki, R. (2024). Mitigating financial mismanagement: Insights from Caliph Umar's governance. *Proceeding of International Conference on Accounting & Finance*, 2, 945–952. Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia.
- Maulana, I. (2024) "An 'ocean grab' for a property megaproject leaves Jakarta fishers grounded," Mongabay (Indonesia), 8 Nov 2024. <https://news.mongabay.com/2024/11/an-ocean-grab-for-a-property-megaproject-leaves-jakarta-fishers-grounded/> Retrieved on December 16, 2024?
- Mohamad Ismail bin Mohamad Yunus. (2017). Good governance according to Islamic perspective. *Fiat Justisia*, 11(3), 200-230. <http://jurnal.fh.unila.ac.id/index.php/fiat>
- Mohammad, T. and Al-Yazid, N. (2001) *Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs: Prepared from the Works of Ibn Katheer, At Tabari, As Suyuti and Other Historians*. Dar Al-Manarah. Retrieved From: <https://archive.org/details/biographies-of-the-rightly-guided-caliphs/page/399/mode/1up> Retrieved on November 16, 2024?
- Musaddad, A. I., & Inuwa, A. M. (2020). Islamic leadership accountability of Umar bin Abdulaziz: A lesson towards good governance in Nigeria. *IKONOMIKA: Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam*, 5(1), 43-54. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.2527/25273434.2020.5.1.43-54>
- Mustapha, R. O. (2024). "Ibadan circular road controversy: Lessons from Umar ibn al-Khattab's ethical governance (II)." *FreshPage*. <https://freshpage.com.ng/news/ibadan-circular-road-controversy-lessons-from-umar-ibn-al-khattabs-ethical-governance-ii/> Retrieved on November 27, 2024?
- Nadvi, M. J., & Khalid, M. (2023). Exploring the historical significance of the social security and welfare systems in Islam: The era of 'Umar ibn al-Khattab. *Journal of Al-Tamaddun*, 18(1), 59-65. DOI <https://doi.org/10.22452/JAT.vol18no1.5>
- Nashrah, J.S, (2019). Development of Urban Architecture the Time of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH in Madinah Period, *EduARCHsia*, 192, no., pp. 124–132, 2020. DOI <https://doi.org/10.2991/aer.k.200214.018>
- Negedu, S. (2025) "Demolition: Abuja elders demand fair compensation for affected communities," *Abuja Inquirer*, 21 Mar 2025 <https://theabujainquirer.com/2025/03/21/demolition-abuja-elders-demand-fair-compensation-for-affected-communities/> Retrieved on February 2, 2025.

- Nursalim, E., & Fitria, N. A. (2024). Values of leadership Umar bin Khattab and Generation Z era. *Proceeding of International Conference on Education, Society, and Humanity*, 2(1), 299-307.
- Ogunbado, A. F., Abu Bakar, Y. S., & Saidi, M. A. (2020). Umar ibn Khattab, an epitome of servant leadership: A sustainable lesson for contemporary leaders. *Journal of Critical Reviews*, 7(8), 1-12.
- Omer, S. (2017) An analysis of the expansion of the mosque of the prophet by caliph 'Umar B. Al-Khattāb (d. 24 A.H./744 C.E.). *Hamdard Islamicus*, 40(1):31-50
- Pedrazzini, S. Vincent-Geslin, A. Thorer (2014). Violence of urbanization, poor neighbourhoods and large-scale projects: Lessons from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, *Built Environment*, 40 (3), 394-407
- Picciotto, R. (2009). *Involuntary resettlement in infrastructure projects: A development perspective*. World Bank Publications.
- Punch (2025) Ibadan Circular Road: Over 1,000 communities protest 500m expansion. 30 July 2025 <https://punchng.com/ibadan-circular-road-over-1000-communities-protest-500m-expansion/> Retrieved on August 29, 2025.
- Rafiki, A. (2020). Islamic leadership: Comparisons and qualities. *IntechOpen*. 1, 1-16. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.90151>
- Ram, E. (2021) “How Nairobi’s ‘road for the rich’ resulted in thousands of homes reduced to rubble,” *Guardian* (UK). 8 Dec 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/dec/08/how-nairobis-road-for-the-rich-resulted-in-thousands-of-homes-reduced-to-rubble>. Retrieved on November 16, 2024?
- Randeree, K. (2009). An Islamic perspective on leadership. *The Global Studies Journal*, 2(1), 197-211
- Robinson, W. C. (2003). *Risks and rights*. The Brookings Institution.
- Schindler, S., Fadaee, S., and Brockington, D. (Eds.), (2021) *Contemporary megaprojects: Organization, vision, and resistance in the 21st century*. Berghahn Books.
- Strauch, L., Takano, G., and Hordijk, M. (2015) Mixed-use spaces and mixed social responses: Popular resistance to a megaproject in Central Lima, Peru. *Habitat International*, 45, 177-184
- Sucilawati, S. (2020). The Concept of Shura in Islamic Governance Practice of Shura during the Caliph Umar Bin Khattab. *The International Journal of Politics and Sociology Research*, 8(1), 19–32. Retrieved from <https://www.ijopsor.pelnus.ac.id/index.php/ijopsor/article/view/29>
- Uroko, C. (2024). “Coastal Highway: FG pays N2.75bn compensation for demolished properties,” *BusinessDay NG*. 1 May 2024. <https://businessday.ng/news/article/lagos-calabar-coastal-highway-fg-to-compensate-property-owners-with-n2-75bn/> Retrieved on December 23, 2024?
- Vanclay, F. (2017). Project-induced displacement. *Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal*, 35(1), 3–21.
- Walker, J., Lipietz, B., Ohaeri, V., & Onyebueke, V. U. (2018). Urban infrastructure projects and displacements in Nigeria.
- Yasin, A. (2014). Economic measures of Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab. *Iraqi University Journal*. 4,39-62
- Zaman, M., Nair, R., & Shi, G. (2021). *Resettlement and development*. Hohai University.