Reducing Discordant Religious Relationships: Ahmadiyya Case in Indonesia

Handoko Ja’far*
Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam “Ma’had Aly Al-Hikam” Malang, Indonesia
* Corresponding author: han@staima-alhikam.ac.id

Abstract

The Ahmadiyya have been labeled as a controversial religious group by the majority of Indonesians. Its inclusion as a component of religious diversity is regarded as a trumping-up divergence. This research aims to analyze the reasons for hostility toward the Ahmadiyya through a review journal, historical storytelling, and exposure to empirical facts, and to provide recommendations for reducing discord and improving relations between different religious groups. The article investigates the role of state law, religious authority, and civil society in shaping attitudes toward Ahmadiyya Muslims, as well as strategies for promoting interfaith dialogue and tolerance. Overall, the article argues that it is critical to promote mutual respect and understanding among religious communities in order to reduce conflict and promote social harmony in Indonesia.

Keywords: reducing, discordant, religious relationships, Ahmadiyya, Indonesia.
1.0 INTRODUCTION

Ahmadiyya case in Indonesia has been one of the most high-profile cases of religious minority persecution in last years. The case has received international attention and condemnation from human rights organizations, which have called on the Indonesian government to protect the rights of religious minorities.

Indonesian government is in a difficult situation. On the one hand, the government must protect its citizens in this regard because Ahmadiyya followers are intimidated by a group or community that does not accept them; on the other hand, the government must decide how to disband and ban the Ahmadiyya (Nugroho, 2017). Indonesian government finds itself in a challenging situation due to the conflict involving Ahmadiyya followers. This issue is complex and multifaceted, requiring careful consideration and analysis. However, the government's primary concern is to ensure the safety and well-being of its citizens, regardless of their religious affiliations. It is essential that the government takes measures to protect the Ahmadiyya community from further harm and intimidation. They must address the issue of intolerance and discrimination faced by this religious minority, as it goes against the principles of religious freedom and equality.

The existence and contribution of the Ahmadiyya in Indonesia has been a subject of debate as an organization of foreign origin. Some scholars dismiss it entirely as unimportant, while others believe it has had a significant impact, for instance, the Ahmadiyya translations are significant because they appeal to the Indonesian intelligentsia and contribute to Quranic studies. Ahmadiyah entered Indonesia through Sumatran students, who studied in India and returned to Indonesia around 1925. They brought a new rational interpretation of the Qur'an. The works of Ahmadiyya thinkers began to become interesting reading material until Haji Agus Salim (a Sarekat Islam figure) stated that of all kinds of interpretations of the Qur'an, the interpretation of Ahmadiyya, “The Holy Qur'an” by Maulana Muhammad Ali is the best (Nurhasim, 2006). The Dutch version's success is due to its language, content, and form. Muslims admire their defense of Islam against Christian missionaries and anti-religious ideologies (Burhani, 2015). The examination of Ahmadiyya's contribution to the discourse on Christianity in Indonesia is argued by Ahmadiyya literature (Tazkiratush-Shahadatain: 38-39), which created a sense of the superiority of Islam and its compatibility with modernity during two periods of instability, and used the issue of Christianity as evidence that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is the second Messiah (Burhani, 2014). Therefore, the Ahmadiyya movement's most prominent contribution to Indonesian Islam is its efforts to counter and respond to Christian missionary activity.

Many researches concern on how Ahmadiyya as a legal religious institution should be treated. Burhani (2014) discusses the issue of religious pluralism and diversity in Indonesia, particularly in the context of the Ahmadiyya movement, which has faced constant attacks and persecution from Muslim institutions and individuals. The researcher raises questions about why the treatment of the Ahmadis by Muslims has been more vitriolic, and what kind of life people who have been excluded from a 'normal' religious identity lead. It argues that the charge of heresy has put the Ahmadiyya in a liminal status, making them vulnerable to persecution. The rise of intolerance in Indonesia is linked to the rise of religious conservatism after the fall of Suharto in 1998 (Burhani, 2014).

Since the fall of the Suharto regime, the Indonesia's leading anti-heretical organization (LPPI) has gained traction and even found its momentum after 1998. It has taken a stance of exclusion against heretical groups, particularly the Ahmadiyya. Since then, it has been able to propagate its mission to root out and eradicate heretical beliefs and even gain support from the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI – Council of Indonesian Ulama) and the government (Burhani, 2016).

Other research demonstrates how Ahmadis are defined and treated under Islamic law, and the legal consequences of charges of apostasy, heresy, or unbelief so that they have been subjected to worse treatment. Burhani (2014) analyzes fatwas against the Ahmadiyya from various institutions and argues that despite their devoutness, they are not exempt from charges of apostasy due to theological deviations from orthodox beliefs.
Theological justifications for anti-Ahmadiyya campaigns in which perpetrators of faith-based violence are seen as fulfilling a religious duty, including jihad, and saving heretics from divine punishment. They construct a legal hierarchy in which divine law is superior to human law, justifying attacks by claiming to be defending the divine viewpoint (Burhani, 2021).

Apart from Ahmadiyya sentiments, this article tries to account for fiqh tolerance, with proposed solutions such as addressing these differences under a single slogan, "Unity in Diversity." With the goal of balancing the nature of Ahmadiyya existence, which is already understood unilaterally, minimizing religious disharmony in Indonesia, and suppressing religious violence against it.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

This social-religious research is a qualitative descriptive study of the Ahmadiyya controversy, which has no place in the hearts of Indonesian Muslims and has even received opposition. The primary goal of this qualitative research is to gain a comprehensive understanding of Ahmadiyya as a contentious religious phenomenon and to describe its relationships and implications in a natural setting using scientific methods. The selection of Ahmadiyya as a research locus was motivated by the fact that Ahmadiyya as a congregation and an Islamic group (al-firqah al-Islamiah) had already been documented in historical pages in books, journals, and magazines (Ensklopedia Islam Indonesia). Records demonstrating the role and contribution of Islamic sects, as well as ideological controversies that cause disharmony in Islamic sect relations (Wilfred, 2012), particularly in Indonesia.

Data is then qualitatively processed after being obtained through in-depth reading from a variety of reliable sources, such as scientific research journals and research-based books includes conclusions from in-depth studies, reading and understanding books on currents in Islam, such as Al-Farq baina al-Firq (al-Baghdadi), Al-Mill wa al-Nibl (Syahrastani), Al-fashl baina al-Mill wa al-Nibl (Ibn Hazm), Al-Iqtishd fi al-I’tiqd (al-Ghazali), Maqlat al-Islamiyyn wa Ikhtilif al-mushalmn (al-Asy’ari) by Ghazali Said and several Kyai (Moslem scholars) representatives from all provinces in Indonesia, facilitated by the Mata Air Community (Musthofa Bisri) and the Wahid Institute (Abdurrahman Wahid), on 22-25 March 2008 in Jakarta. After obtaining justification through observation of phenomena that occur in the context of Ahmadiyya existence and resistance, qualitative data processing focuses on data construction to answer research questions. The result of data processing using the content analysis is a detailed description of religious dynamics in dealing with Ahmadiyya. However, whatever it takes, it doesn’t influence this literature research in providing an objective result toward such controversial issues as the researcher posted himself in a neutral position to investigate them.

3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

Discordant religious relationships refer to situations where two or more individuals with different religious beliefs are involved in a relationship. This can be a challenging situation to navigate as the differences in religious core values and practices may lead to conflicts between partners. Interreligious conflicts and tensions are often rooted in differing beliefs, practices, and interpretations of religious texts. These conflicts can arise between different religious groups or even within the same religious group. The result can be discrimination, persecution, or even violence, leading to long-standing animosity and distrust between communities.

Misdirection of the religious understanding of Ardhi Husein in Probolinggo who led the Padepokan Yayasan Kanker-Narkoba Cahaya Alam (YKNCA) was the aftermath of the MUI Fatwa Probolinggo (2005). Likewise, the misdirection of Yusman Roy’s two-language salat (prayer) in Malang (2006), followers of Losarang Dayak (2007), Majelis Dzikir Asmaul Husna in Garut (2007), tarekat Wahidiyah in Tasikmalaya (2007), recitation group Life Behind Life in Cirebon (2010), the Robbani Pole in Sukabumi (2005), Syiah heresy and so on cannot be separated from the involvement of the local MUI. The Central MUI also issued a number of heretical fatwas against several groups such as fatwas against followers of the Salamullah
religion led by Lia Eden who had been issued in 1997, Qiyadah Islamiyah (2007), Fajar Nusantara Movement (Gafatar) 2016 community, and Ahmadiyah (1980 and 2005). A number of the fatwas make MUI an important actor - although not the only one - intolerance and acts of violence against heterodox groups, even though the MUI has always refused if the fatwas are associated with acts of violence against heterodox groups. All of the fatwas for deception are based on claims to protect the faith of Muslims (Rumadi, 2020). According to the Indonesian Conference on Religion and Peace (ICRP), victims of religious violence are more likely to be groups than individuals. The ICRP calculated it. According to the ICRP, there were 32 groups that were victims of religiously motivated violence in 2007 (Umam, 2008).

According to the Setara Institute for Peace and Democracy, there were 216 instances of religious freedom breaches in 2010 alone. 75 cases involved Christian congregations, and 43 Christian houses of worship were attacked, however the authorities frequently did not step in. Muslims in Indonesia burned down two churches in retaliation for what they saw as an unfairly light prison term for a Christian (Mölzer, 2011). Indonesia is the country with the most Muslims in the world. Almost 90% of the 240 million inhabitants are followers of Islam, giving the country the world's largest Muslim population. Religious minorities in Indonesia have long complained about increasing intolerance. Although the state proclaims religious tolerance, clashes occur time and time again, including Ahmadiyya cases.

Studies on Ahmadiyya in Indonesia are not as numerous as in other parts of the country where religious groups have clashed with the Ahmadiyya community. Ahmadiyya Muslims have long faced persecution, discrimination, and hostility in a variety of countries as a result of laws and policies that violate their fundamental right to religious or belief freedom. State authorities in Pakistan, Algeria, and Malaysia, for example, have declared or are in the process of legally declaring Ahmadiyya Muslims to be non-Muslims, restricted their ability to worship, prosecuted them for practicing their faith, and tolerated societal actors' attacks on them (Greenwalt, 2021). The restrictions and persecution faced by the Ahmadiyya community can be understood through a combination of historical, political, and religious factors. Some of the key reasons for these restrictions are theological differences, political exploitation of religious identity, laws and legal frameworks, social and cultural factors, a lack of legal protection, and the role of religious authorities. The tension arises from a unique circumstance: Indonesia, the large Muslim country uses democracy as a political system, but religious politics are evident. This situation directly jeopardizes the presence of the Ahmadiyya community (Regus, 2019). The result of a complex interplay of theological, political, legal, social, and cultural factors contribute to an environment where discrimination and persecution against Ahmadis persist, often with the tacit or explicit support of state authorities.

Several publications generously contribute to enrich an academic discourse on Ahmadiyya such as Gerakan Ahmadiyya di Indonesia (LiS, 2005), Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community, Conflict, Nationality, and Humanity (Cantrik Pustaka, 2018), and Ahmadiyya Caliphate and the Nation State (Cantrik Pustaka, 2019). These books cover a wide range of topics, including social and cultural aspects, preaching activities, rituals, the caliphate system (Faiz, 2019), nationalism, and the nation state. The pilot projects have already contributed significantly to the academic discourse on Ahmadiyya, and they will inevitably lead to social misunderstandings in the community (Sodik & Sojibto, 2020) such as dissenting opinion on the existence of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad that demonstrates the different belief among Ahmadiyya community. The Ahmadiyya community, on the other hand, is a logical result of Indonesia's multicultural society, and, surprisingly, it has had a much more visible presence in Indonesia than the Shi'a (Beck, 2005). Since the 1920s, Ahmadiyya has been present in Indonesia with two distinct subgroups (Fadhillah, 2017), namely Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia (GAI), which is identified as the Ahmadiyya's Lahore branch, and Jemaat Ahmadiyya Indonesia (JAI), which is identified as the Ahmadiyya's Qâdiyân branch.

The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, which was established in 1889 in Qadian, India, by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, emerged as a controversial sect of Islam due to their belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, which contradicts mainstream Muslim beliefs. This controversy has also been present in Indonesia, where the Ahmadiyya community has faced persecution and discrimination (Umam, 2003). Despite the fact that Indonesia recognizes religious freedom, the Indonesian Council of Ulama issued a fatwa in 2008 declaring Ahmadiyya beliefs to be deviant from Islam. As a result, there has been an increase
in violence and discrimination against the Ahmadiyya community, with attacks on mosques and members (Nurhasim, 2006). This case demonstrates that, while it has not been completely successful in resolving discordant religious relationships, involving individuals from multiple levels—policymakers, educational professionals, and civil society organizations—has created a constructive environment conducive to countering minority-phobia discourses intersecting with.

4.0 FINDING AND DISCUSSION

The combination of these research methods; literature review and content analysis likely allowed the author to explore the Ahmadiyya controversy comprehensively, uncovering the themes of discord and violence, as well as the associated legal and religious dimensions, ultimately leading to the proposed solution of implementing *Fiqh* tolerance.

Through in depth reading with the use of content analysis, this study discovered two disharmony issues associated with the Indonesian Ahmadiyya case: 1. Its controversy, which was discovered to occur in Muslim society. 2. Violence was used to oppose its movement, and it was backed up by the issue of regional Sharia regulations, the Joint Decree (SKB), and the Fatwa of the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI), and one of solutions, the need of *Fiqh* tolerance implementation.

4.1 Controversy of Ahmadiyya

The Institute for Islamic Research and Studies (LPPI) concluded in its investigation of Ahmadiyya that there are points of heresy and deviation from actual Islamic teachings. These mistakes and irregularities are as follows:

1. Ahmadiyya Qadiyan regards India’s Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet and messenger. Anyone who does not believe in it is an apostate and an infidel.

2. Ahmadiyya Qadiyan has its own holy book, the Tadzkirah.

3. The holy book "Tadzkirah" is a collection of "revelations" sent down by "God" to "Prophet Mirza Ghulam Ahmad," and its sanctity is equal to that of the Holy Qur’an and other holy books such as the Torah, Psalms, and Gospel, as both are revelations from God.

4. The Ahmadiyya community has its own holy places for pilgrimage, namely Rabwah and Qadiyan in India. "How unfortunate is the person who has forbidden himself to have fun in the Great Hajj to Qadiyan?" they said. "Hajj to Makkah without pilgrimage to Qadiyan is a dry and rough pilgrimage." And "Prophet" Mirza Ghulam Ahmad never went on a pilgrimage to Makkah during his lifetime.

5. The Ahmadiyya have their own method of calculating the date, month, and year. The Ahmadiyya months are as follows: 1. Suluh; 2. Tabligh; 3. Aman; 4. Syahadah; 5. Hijrah; 6. Ihsan; and 7. Wafa. 9. Tabuk; 8. Zuhur Ikha, Nubuwah, and Fatah are the tenth and eleventh names. While the year is Hijri Syamsi, which is commonly abbreviated as HS, the year of Ahmadiyya when this research was conducted, 1994 M/1414 H, was 1373 HS. The obligation to use the above-mentioned Ahmadiyya date, month, and year was imposed by the second Ahmadiyya caliph, Basyiruddin Mahmud Ahmad.

6. Based on the words of "God" received by the Ahmadiyya "Prophet" and "Rasul" contained in the holy book "Tadzkirah," p. 21, which reads: "He is God who sent His Apostle "Mirza Ghulam Ahmad" with guidance and the true religion in order for Him to win him over all religions."

7. To summarize, Ahmadiyya has its own prophets and apostles, holy book, date, month, and year, pilgrimage site, and caliph, Thahir Ahmad, who is now the 4th caliph and resides in London, England. All Ahmadiyya members worldwide must submit to and obey his orders unconditionally. People who do not practice Ahmadiyya are considered infidels, and
Ahmadiyya women are not permitted to marry men who do not practice Ahmadiyya. Those who refuse to accept Ahmadiyya will be destroyed.

8. Whereas the Prophet Muhammad’s duties and functions as Prophet and Messenger, as explained in the Muslim holy book Al Qur’an, were canceled and replaced by the Ahmadiyya "prophet," Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, according to the "verses" of the Ahmadiyya holy book Tadzkirah.

Accordingly, the majority of world scholars agree that Ahmadiyya is not a branch of Islam. Because their teachings have deviated from Islamic aqeedah. Among them is what the Islamic Fiqh League (Majma’ Fiqh Islami) has said about Ahmadiyya doctrine deviations like the end of prophethood (Ahmad Sarwat, 2005).

The main point of contention among most scholars, particularly Sunnis, is revelation. The concept of revelation, which is closely related to prophethood, became the main source of contention in the case of Ahmadiyya, along with the recipient of the revelation, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. According to Ayym al-Shulh, p. 74, the two Ahmadiyya groups, later known as Qodiyan and Lahore, experienced a critical divergence of thought when it came to believing in the existence of the ultimate prophet. In this case, the Qadiyan, particularly Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud Ahmad, son of the Ahmadiyya Movement’s founder, appears to have misunderstood what the Ahmadiyya Movement’s founder, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, believed: Muhammad was the last prophet, and there would be no more prophets, either the old prophet or the new prophet (www.Ahmadiyya.org). Because Ahmadiyya Qadiyan believes that other prophets will continue to appear after the Prophet Muhammad’s death until the end of time, Buruzi prophets, or prophets who did not follow Shari’a, were those who appeared after the Prophet Muhammad (Zulkarnain, 2005).

4.2 Violence on Ahmadiyya Community

The Report of Condition of Freedom of Religion Belief and Religious Minorities in Indonesia in 2016 reports at least 185 acts of religious and belief freedom were violated. There were 21 incidents of violence in Ahmadiyya. The government, according to Institute for Democracy and Peace, is to blame. 92 violations were committed against those deemed heretical, including arrests, restrictions, detentions, and sentences. Meanwhile, the other 93 violations occurred because the state permitted certain groups, such as the Institute for Islamic Research and Studies (LPPI), the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), and the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), to commit acts of violence (SET-IR-4, 2016). Some studies explain what has been actually happening in Indonesia. The most common explanation says that these developments are a product of democratization and decentralization where vigilant organizations such as the Islamic Defender Front (Front Pembela Islam [FPI]) and Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) take the opportunity. Since 2005 when there were direct regional head elections, both at the provincial and district/city levels, they influenced local leaders (Varsney at al., 2004). The lively regulation of religious nuances in a number of regions is also often referred to as strong evidence of the influence of conservatives in influencing local policies (Rumadi at al., 2011).

Violence against Ahmadiyya members in various regions such as Bogor, Sukabumi, Cianjur, and others demonstrates that Islamic groups’ dominant mode of operation in resolving internal Muslim problems remains vigilantism. It proves that "vigilante" itself is still the dominant modus operandi of Islamic groups in resolving internal problems among Muslims. Worse, moderate Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah appear to be unaware that some Muslims are being persecuted without recourse. This situation is viewed as passing wind and does not need to be addressed (Nurhasim, 2012).

The escalation of violent acts during this period was caused by Indonesian Muslims’ lack of foresight in distinguishing between the two Ahmadiyya groups, which differ in their doctrines and teachings, as well as their one-sided understanding of Ahmadiyya, which does not generally use a historical approach.

With violence and large demonstrations, in 2008, many Muslims in Indonesia protested Ahmadi Muslims. The religious conservatives placed pressure on the government to monitor and harass the Community. Ahmadi Muslim Mosque was burned (Reges, 2008). In the province of West Java, in the month
of July 2010, a crowd of 200 Indonesians besieged an Ahmadi Mosque in the Manislor village's Kuningan district. Before being broken up by the police, the mob stoned the mosque (Aljazeera, 2010). In 2011, the sect faced widespread calls for a "total ban" in Indonesia (McGeown, 2011). On February 6, 2011, 1,500 radical Muslim rioters surrounded an Ahmadi neighborhood in Cikeusik, Banten province, and beat to death 3 Ahmadi Muslims, injuring 5, while several other Ahmadi Muslims managed to evacuate their homes and ran for their lives. Footage of the bludgeoning of their naked bodies, while policemen watched on, was posted on YouTube and subsequently broadcast on international media (Allard, 2011). In early 2013, city officials sealed the Al-Misbah Mosque in Bekasi near Jakarta three times. In April 2014, the Indonesian Ulema Council of Ciamis in West Java asked the local Ahmadiyya community to cease activity at the Khilafat Nur Mosque after police warned from possible attacks following the legislative election. This was rejected by the Ahmadiyya community insisting on the state being responsible for guaranteeing religious freedom for its citizens. The Wahid Institute reaffirmed the Ahmadiyya's stance warning the government not to take the wrong action (Dipa, 2014). In Cisalada, a village south of Jakarta marks a sign which says that it is "forbidden for [an] Ahmadi to use this road," an example of segregation of Ahmadi Muslims from the Muslim majority (Anthony, 2011). Following multiple deadly attacks on Ahmadis in Cikeusik, Banten province, an Indonesian politician once suggested that Ahmadis should be moved to one of thousands of Indonesia's uninhabited islands in order to prevent conflicts between Ahmadi Muslims and Muslim conservatives (Jakarta Post, 2011).

Furthermore, the government's pressure, which resulted in the issuance of a joint decree (SKB) and the implementation of the Shariat Regional Regulation, as well as the heretical fatwa issued by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), exacerbated the problem while strengthening aggressiveness and escalating violence.

4.3 Controversial Issues of Regional Sharia Regulation, Joint Decree (SKB), and MUI Fatwa

The need for religious authenticity in the instance of the Sharia regional regulation was successful in fostering the unity that a restless society requires. So far, existing statutory items have been viewed as Western products that have failed and must be swiftly replaced with new, more authentic ones. In other words, it is necessary to realize the Islamization of local laws. In actuality, according to Law No. 22/1999, the regions were not given authority over religious concerns. According to Article 7's first sentence, "regional authority includes authority in all areas of government, except for authority in foreign policy, defense and security, justice, monetary and fiscal, religion, and other authorities" (Adnan and Panggabean, 2004). However, the facts show otherwise. As a result, apart from causing problems because they often conflict with the legal products above them, the presence of these sharia regional regulations in general shows the inability of the state to stand above all elements of different citizens. Non-Muslim minorities, women, and Ahmadiyah are the targeted groups of this sharia regional regulation. Legally, they are prioritized in such a way that they lose many of their rights as citizens. Specifically, on the issue of Ahmadiyya, several regions have even issued regulations specifically prohibiting their organizational activities, long before the central government did the same.

Departing from demographic facts that show that the majority of Indonesia's population is Muslim, they argue that Muslims are the group most entitled to determine the direction of this nation's political journey. What is interesting, but somewhat surprising, is that they use modern political terms in expressing their arguments. They, for example, often use democratic reasons to interpret their presence in politics. By using democratic terms, they also view the presence of minority groups as something that is separate and therefore must be excluded. This happened in the case of the prioritization of Ahmadiyah in post-Soeharto Indonesia. Many Muslim elites from anti-Ahmadiyah groups pressured the state to ban the existence of Ahmadiyah in Indonesia by using all available formal mechanisms. Normatively, they refer to the MUI fatwa, which states that Ahmadiyah is deviant. MUI issued fatwas condemning Ahmadiyya deviance twice: once during the MUI Second National Conference on May 26-June 1, 1980, and again during the MUI VII National Conference on July 26-29, 2005. These two MUI fatwas had never influenced state policy before. It only has a moral impact, and its reach is limited to specific Islamic communities (Mudzakkir, 2008).
The effectiveness of the pressure that compelled the state—via the Ministers of Religion, Home Affairs, and the Attorney General—to finally issue a Joint Decree (SKB) prohibiting Ahmadiyya activities in Indonesia on June 9, 2008. The Joint Ministerial Decrees for the Ministers of Religion, Home Affairs, and the Attorney General were allegedly based solely on pressure from "most Islamic" groups and fatwas issued by the MUI and Bakorpakem. Meanwhile, MUI and JAI coexist, and Bakorpakem lacks a solid legal and constitutional foundation (Jawa Pos, 2008).

The SKB includes six (6) points: (1) issuing a warning and instructing all citizens not to tell or interpret a religion in Indonesia that deviates from Law No. 1 PNPS 1965 concerning the prevention of religious defamation; (2) issuing a warning and instructing all adherents, including the management of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Congregation (JAI), as long as they adhere to Islam, to cease all activities that are not in accordance with the general interpretation of Islam; (3) issue a warning and direct all citizens to protect and preserve the lives of religious people while refraining from taking actions that violate the law against JAI adherents; (5) issue warnings and direct citizens who fail to heed warnings and orders to face sanctions in accordance with applicable laws; and (6) issue warnings and direct citizens who fail to heed warnings and orders to face sanctions in accordance with applicable laws. The government responded to the fatwa of Ahmadiyah deception by issuing a Joint Decree of the Minister (Surat Keputusan Bersama Menteri, SKB) of Religion, Attorney General and Minister of Home Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia No. 3 of 2008; KEP-033 / A / JA / 6/2008; and 199 of 2008 concerning the Government's Warning to Adherents, Members and / or Management Members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyyah Community (JAI) and Citizens. The core of the SKB is a prohibition on JAI to spread its beliefs on the basis of maintaining security and public order (Rumadi, 2020).

The legal basis for prohibiting Ahmadiyya activities is Law No. 1/PNPS/1965, which prohibits telling, suggesting, or seeking support for an interpretation of an Indonesian religion, as well as engaging in religious activities that resemble those activities but deviate from the basic teachings of that religion. According to that logic, the state considers Ahmadiyya to be non-Islamic and thus lacks the right to recognize Islam. They are free to practice their current beliefs as long as they do not employ Islamic religious symbols (Mudzakkir, 2008).

Imam Ghazali Said emphasized in the article, “Defending the Oppressed Ahmadiyya” that the MUI fatwa of misdirection and non-Islamic judgments against Ahmadiyya Qodiyan on 1 June 1980, which was strengthened by the MUI fatwa of 15 July 2005, emerged after certain sects claiming to be the most Islamic attacked the JAI headquarters in Parung, Bogor. In this case, the MUI fatwa has legitimized violence against JAI, which has never physically disturbed, let alone attacked, other Islamic groups (Jawa Pos, 2008).

Rather than misleading the victim, the MUI should issue a fatwa against the attacker (criminal actor) (criminal victim). The MUI's policies are heavily influenced by Amin Jamaluddin's (LP II book, 2008), “Ahmadiyah dan Pembajakan al-Qur’an” and Hartono Ahmad (Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2008), “Aliran dan Paham Sesat di Indonesia.” In this context, the MUI and other Islamic organizations are supposed to acknowledge that a "non-Islamic" verdict will result in acts of violence.

Meanwhile, Amin Abdullah stated in the MUI article, “Ahmadiyya and the Jurisprudence of Tolerance,” that this was very surprising given Ahmadiyya's presence in Indonesia since 1924. They, too, have the right to develop (Suara Merdeka, 2008). Furthermore, so far, people of different religions have been associated with a tolerance and willingness to tolerate differences among us. In this context, it is critical to implement a Fiqh of tolerance.

### 4.4 In Need of Jurisprudence of Tolerance

Term tolerance in Islamic literature is called al-tasāmūh. Ulama used the term tasāmūh to describe the meaning of the premise (dalil) concerned. They did not understand the goal so it is needed to understand others' lafadz (Jurjani, yyyy) (Burhanuddin, 2018). Tasāmūh in language means extend giving and so forth (al-ittisā fî al-i’thâi wa ghairih) (al-Din, 2009). If referring to its root word, the term tasāmūh is derived from the word masahab which means simplify (Almaany, 2010). In term, definition of tolerance (tasāmūh) is ability
to respect the differences as an effort to realize equality (al-Din, 2009). It is mean that tolerant people are they who are able to respect differences to realize a harmonious life in a plural society (Burhanuddin, 2018).

Tolerance in Islam rightly understood is patience toward a practice or opinion one disapproves of. This understanding may come as a surprise to many people who interpret tolerance simply as a synonym for the words acceptance or agreement. Islamic tolerance entails disagreement yet a firm moral commitment to the decent treatment of the person with whom one disagrees. So tolerance in Islam can be understood as a patient forbearance against something which is disliked or disapproved of (Siddiqi, 2018). The scope of religious tolerance can be devided into two categoris: (1) Tolerance with non Moslem in field of workship (al-tasämuh fi aslu’ini al-,ihâhab al-mahdhah); and (2) Tolerance with non Moslem in public affairs (al-tasämuh fi aslu’ini al-’âmah), where of both scopes have been regulated in sharia that contain some permissions and limitations. Failure to understand those principles has been caused effect that leads to two extreme action namely intolerance behavior of interreligious differences or excessive tolerance behavior without regard to the boundaries of normative principles. Violations the principles of tolerance besides being sanctioned by the state law, also can be sanctioned by religion as a form of denial of God (Burhanuddin, 2018).

Tolerance jurisprudence (fiqh of tolerance), according to Amin Abdullah, is based more on ways of thinking, getting along, and interacting. Toleranza e Pluralismo by Sebastiano Mosso asserts that tolerance is fundamentally rooted in human self-awareness of the promptings of a true, straight, and healthy conscience. As a result, tolerance is based on an open, pluralistic, and multicultural attitude toward others. Tolerance law presumes a positive basic human choice of the conditions that bind fellow humans bound by oppression, injustice, and arbitrariness. The willingness to accept, appreciate, and respect others as human beings with both advantages and disadvantages is that fundamental attitude. As a result, the qiṣḥ of tolerance requires human sincerity and moral courage to recognize and accept differences in daily life without being accompanied byarchy and radical actions, which are clearly contrary to Islam as rahmatan lil’lamin.

The solution in the midst of the Ahmadiyya conflict is not to ask them to return to mainstream Islam or to leave Islam and create a new religion, as suggested by the Minister of Religion, Maftuh Basyuni, but to figure out how to revoke the MUI’s deviant fatwa and allow them to coexist with other people, while still prioritizing an attitude from March 2006 "In my opinion, Ahmadiyya does not need to be a new religion," I said in response to the Minister of Religion's statement that tolerance has traditionally been associated with people of different faiths. Internal adherents, the implication is, lack tolerance and a sense of appropriateness outside of their religion. The tragic events in West Nusa Tenggara and other areas underscore Muslims’ lack of mutual respect for differences and diversity (Suara Merdeka, 2008).

Furthermore, after conducting extensive research, reading, and comprehending books on Islamic currents such as Al-Farq baina al-Firāq (al-Baghdadi), Al-Milâl wa al-Nihāl (Syahrastani), Al-Fastîl baina al-Milâl wa al-Nihâl (Ibn Hazm), Al-Iqtiṣād ji al-I’tiqād (al-Ghazali), Maqālat al-Islamiyyīn wa Ikhtilāf al-Mushallīn Ghazali Said met with several Kiai representatives from all provinces in Indonesia, facilitated by the Mata Air Community (Musthofa Bisri) and the Wahid Institute (Abdurrahman Wahid), on March 22–25, 2008, in Jakarta concluded that humans who say two sentences of the shahada and follow the pillars of Islam and faith, while not opposing either of the two pillars of faith or Islam, must be considered and valued as our Muslim brothers and sisters whose civil rights must be protected. The current situation explains the injustice that has befallen JAI, as well as the disregard for their civil rights. In addition to ignoring and even violating human rights, this is in accordance with our Constitution, UUD 45, Article 29, paragraphs 1 and 2.

The criterion of Muslim-believers received justification after a study of the book of Tadzikirah, testimonies, interrogations, and dialogues with JAI leaders and laypeople, which turned out to be true to the criteria of Muslims and believers. Thus, since the fall of the Soeharto regime, the freedom of sharia formalism in state life has obscured the similarities that appear in diversity. It is distinguished by the consolidation of right-wing Islamic groups, which have played an important role in the abolition of diversity (Jawa Pos, 2009).
Ironically, Indonesia is regarded as a laboratory for religious harmony (depag.go.id, May 28, 2009), as evidenced by statements made by the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Frattini, and the founder of the Sant’Egidio community, Andrea Riccardi, at the opening of an international seminar titled Unity in Diversity: The Indonesian Model for a Society in which to Live Together, held on March 4, 2009, in Rome.

In fact, religious affiliation differences characterize the current state of religious life in Indonesia. Accepting differences without a thorough understanding of their meaning and essence leaves us vulnerable to the temptations of primal interests and individual and group egocentrism. In other words, when religious sentiments and symbols are used as axes or triggers, disturbances in the peace can spread quickly.

5.0 CONCLUSION

It has been 134 years since its inception in 1889, and it is now in its 99th year since its first entry into Indonesia in 1924. Initially, the Ahmadiyya movement was regarded favorably in Indonesia. However, the Muslim community’s and the government’s support for Ahmadiyya shifted 180 degrees along the way.

A situation demonstrating the existence of disharmony in a faith-based relationship, as well as a lack of maturity in addressing theological differences, places Ahmadiyya in an awkward position between its own existence and its opposition to it.

In today’s world, Ahmadiyya’s messianic teachings are less acceptable. Despite the fact that many people sympathize with him and even thank him for his work and Ahmadiyya’s involvement in preaching, Ahmadiyya was allegedly distorting the creed, as Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself stated to his son, Mirza Bassiruddin Mahmud Ahmad (Ahmadiyya Qadiyan), that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad experienced a shift in akidah, namely denying his own. It follows that there are two distinct Ahmadiyya communities (Qadiyan and Lahore). Indonesian Muslims are unaware of the distinction.

The controversy surrounding his teachings had already tarnished religious relations, leading to an increase in the escalation of acts of violence in the name of religion. As a solution to this problem, historical in-depth re-reading continues to provide Muslims with understanding, as does the use of tolerance jurisprudence (fiqh of tolerance) to mitigate the effects of the controversy and make it a necessity that must be implemented come along with an effort on how to reduce discordant religious relationships by focusing on common grounds: similarities between the various faiths could also be highlighted instead of focusing only on differences. Beside addressing misconceptions, Moslem can clarify distorted perceptions or negative stereotypes surrounding certain religions through targeted publications, workshops, and seminars to develop the concept of tolerance without mortgaging our beliefs.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank the Head of Research and Community Services Center of STAI Ma’had Aly Al-Hikam Malang, Dr. Rosidin, who introduced UTM and suggested the submission to UMRAN. I would also like to thank the Rector of UIN, Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang, and Prof. Dr. M. Zainuddin, who have highlighted the theological side of this literature research.

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